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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kay James Kofoed appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress. Specifically, he asserts that suppression was proper on the grounds that the
officers' entry into his residence was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and I.C. § 194409, in that it failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the "knock and
announce" rule.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Kofoed resided at 2007 ½ N. Whitley Drive in a loft space above a workshop
in a metal building. (R., p.100.) In October, 2006, during the arrest of an employee of
Mr. Kofoed, officers walked through the building in order to allow another individual to
obtain identification.

(R., pp.100-101.) The officers did not conduct a search of the

building at that time. (R., p.101.)
On October 24, 2006, Officer Huff responded to a complaint of a strong chemical
odor at a grocery store a short distance away from the Mr. Kofoed's residence.
(R., p.101.)

He eventually tracked the smell to an area of storage units near

Mr. Kofoed's workshop.

(R., p.101.) On October 30, 2006, the officer responded to

another complaint regarding a chemical odor coming from the same area. (R., p.101.)
Officer Huff summoned Officer Hall of the Payette Police Department; both officers
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identified the odor as consistent with that which is present during the manufacture of
methamphetamine. (R., p.101.)
A search warrant was applied for and issued on November 2, 2006, and was
executed the following day at approximately 11 a.m. (R., p.101.) After knocking on the
door and announcing their presence, officers heard a sound like something was
dropped and heard footsteps moving quickly away from the door. (R., p.101.) As a
result, the officers "immediately" entered the building and served the warrant.
(R., p.101.)

The district court found that "the officers knocked on the door,

approximately two seconds later announced their position and authority, and
approximately four seconds thereafter were entering the workshop." (R., p.105.) The
occupants, therefore, were given four seconds to open the door following the
announcement that the knock came from a police officer. Mr. Kofoed filed a motion to
suppress, asserting, among other arguments, that the officers failed to comply with the
"knock and announce" rule. (R., p.60.)
The district court found that an exigency was present:
the warrant was executed close to noon, when people would normally be
up and about. However, the officers could not be sure of the amount of
drugs or other evidence that would be present. Thus, when they heard
sounds that indicated people were quickly moving away from the door, it
was reasonable for them to believe that evidence was being, or was about
to be, destroyed, thereby created exigent circumstances that justified the
officers' hurried entry into the building.
(R., p.106.) The district court, therefore, denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.100.)

Mr. Kofoed entered in to a conditional plea wherein he pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance and he preserved the right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., p.117.)
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The district court imposed a unified

sentence of four years, with one and one-half years fixed, and the court retained
jurisdiction.

(R., p.136.)

Mr. Kofoed timely appealed.

(R., p.141.)

On appeal, he

asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the
officers failed to substantially comply with the "knock and announce" rule.

I
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kofoed's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kofoed's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the police were excused from adhering to the

"knock and announce" rule's requirement because of an exigency. Mr. Kofoed asserts
that the district court erred.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kofoed's Motion To Suppress
Mr. Kofoed asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

because the officers did not substantially comply with the "knock and announce" rule.
1.

The Officers Did Not Substantially Comply With The "Knock And
Announce" Rule

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." (emphasis added.) "The United States Supreme Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that prior to executing a
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search warrant the police must knock on the door, announce their identity and authority,
and wait a reasonable time for the occupants to respond before entering forcibly."

Statev. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628,630,130 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
387 (1997); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)).
Idaho Code § 19-4409 provides that in executing a warrant, "[t]he officer may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or any
thing therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance." J.C. § 19-4409. "However, this rule is not absolute and the Court
recognized that, under some circumstances, an unannounced entry was permissible."
Ramos, 142 Idaho at 631, 130 P.3d at 1169 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 387).
"Specific exigencies include threats to officer safety or a likelihood that evidence
might be destroyed." Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 391, 117 S. Ct. at 1420, 137
L.Ed.2d at 622.) "In order to justify such an entry, the police must have reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing prior to entry would pose a threat to their safety
or inhibit the investigation." Id. (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 36; Richards, 520 U.S. at
394.) 'The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more
than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id. (citing State v. Cerino,
141 Idaho 736, 738, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2005)). "In justifying the particular
intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." Id. (citing Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 21 (1968); Cerino, 141 ldahoat738, 117
P.3d at 878.)
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Even if exigent circumstances are initially absent, however, reasonable suspicion
of an exigency may develop when the police arrive to execute a search warrant, and the
police may then proceed with immediate forced entry. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 37. The
police may also conduct a forced entry after knocking and announcing if exigent
circumstances arise prior to an occupant answering the door. See id. at 38. Post-knock
exigencies are to be treated the same as exigencies giving rise to a no-knock entry. Id.
at 41.

The type of evidence that provides reasonable suspicion of exigent

circumstances, allowing forced entry after the police arrive or after they knock and
announce, is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 36.
In this case, the district court found that "the officers knocked on the door,
approximately two seconds later announced their position and authority, and
approximately four seconds thereafter were entering the workshop." (R., p.105.) The
occupants, therefore, were given four seconds to open the door following the
announcement that the knock came from a police officer. The district court found that
an exigency was present:
the warrant was executed close to noon, when people would normally be
up and about. However, the officers could not be sure of the amount of
drugs or other evidence that would be present. Thus, when they heard
sounds that indicated people were quickly moving away from the door, it
was reasonable for them to believe that evidence was being, or was about
to be, destroyed, thereby created exigent circumstances that justified the
officers' hurried entry into the building.
(R., p.106.) The district court erred.
Regarding the fact that the officers could not be sure of the amount of drugs or
other evidence in the residence, "the United States Supreme Court has held that there
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is no blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for drug investigations."
Ramos, 142 Idaho at 631, 130 P.3d at 1169 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 393.)

In

Richards, the United States Supreme Court determined that, "while felony drug
investigations may pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence,
it is an overgeneralization to find every drug investigation poses these risks." Id. (citing
Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-94.) Additionally, if a drug crime category exception to the
knock-and-announce rule is recognized, that same logic could be applied to a multitude
of other crimes and would eventually make the knock-and-announce rule essentially
meaningless. Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.). Given this, the Court held that
justification for a no-knock entry must be determined on a case-by-case analysis, and
there cannot be an exception to this analysis by making particular categories of alleged
crimes an automatic exigent circumstance. Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-394.)
The fact that the officers did not know the quantity of drugs that might be in the
residence does not justify the failure to substantially comply with the "knock and
announce" rule. Absent an informant who is in the residence at the time the police
arrive, police officers are never going to know the precise amount of drugs they may
find. To hold that officers may suddenly enter because they are unsure of the quantity
of drugs is the equivalent of a blanket exception to the "knock and announce" rule in
drug cases.
Furthermore, the fact that the officers heard movement away from the door does
not establish an exigency in this case. In the affidavit in support of the search warrant,
Officer Huff stated that his observations were "indicative of an illegal drug operation"
and that Officer Hall "identified the odor as an odor that is consistent with, and often
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present during, the manufacture of methamphetamine."

(R., p.74.)

Therefore, the

officers had suspicion not that simple drug possession was occurring at the residence,
but that drug manufacture was occurring. While it may be possible for an occupant to
dispose of a small quantity of drugs prior to an officer entering a residence, it is
extremely unlikely that evidence of manufacturing, such as a methamphetamine
laboratory and all of the precursors to methamphetamine, would be quickly destroyed.
And while the officer stated, "it is my opinion that upon service of this search warrant an
operational laboratory will not be discovered; however, remnants of the lab such as
glass beakers, finished

product, quantities of precursors, and other forms of

paraphernalia will be found," (R., p.75), there was no way for him to know before
entering whether he would find an operational laboratory or just remnants of a lab.
In any event, due to the fact that the officers possessed information that
manufacturing was occurring in the residence, it is highly unlikely that movement away
from the door would create the exigency that the evidence would be destroyed. The
fact that the officers were unsure of the quantities of drugs they might and that they
heard movement did not create an exigency in this case. The district court therefore
erred in holding that, due to an exigency, the officers were excused from substantially
complying with the "knock and announce" rule.

2.

Suppression Is The Remedy Under The Idaho Constitution

In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence obtained
following a violation of the "knock and announce" rule.

Id. at 599.

However,

suppression remains the remedy in Idaho. Ramos, 142 Idaho at 634, 130 P.3d at 1172.
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In Ramos, the Court of Appeals concluded, after finding that the officers did not
substantially comply with the "knock and announce" rule, "even if exclusion of the
evidence is not the necessary remedy for the Fourth Amendment violation, it would be
required here for violation of Idaho's Constitution and statutory law."

Id.

The court

noted, "long before the exclusionary rule was found to apply to the states through the
Due Process Clause, it was the law in Idaho. Id. (citing State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695,
703, 89 P.2d 197, 201 (1939)). Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the "rule
is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's
constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if
request for its suppression be timely made." Connor, 59 Idaho at 703, 89 P.2d at 201.
Furthermore, in analyzing Idaho's knock-and-announce statutes, the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that, once it is determined a defendant's rights have been violated by
police entry into a residence, evidence resulting from the entry must be suppressed.
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 594, 586 P.2d 671, 679 (1978).

In explaining its

decision, the Idaho Supreme Court held that any other 'result would completely nullify
the knock-and-announce statutes and would create a dangerous situation for citizens
and police officers alike. Id.
Therefore, under Rauch and Ramos, suppression remains the remedy in Idaho
despite the holding Hudson.

It is the required remedy in this case for the failure to

substantially comply with the "knock and announce" requirement.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Kofoed respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2008.
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